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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of cases involving administrative law issues were decided by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit during its 1978-79
term. Of the twenty cases discussed in this section, all of which primarily
involved administrative law, the government or administrative agency was
upheld in fifteen.
A major case in the administrative law area dealt with warrantless
searches. In Savz'na Home Industries, Inc. v. Secretay of Labor,I the court found
that the rule of Marshall o. Barlow's, Inc. 2 prohibiting warrantless searches
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 19703 did not apply retro-
actively.
Other administrative law topics considered during the term included
procedural due process, jurisdiction, standing, and exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. Several federal agencies were represented in more than one
case. The agencies which were litigants in several unrelated cases were the
Interstate Commerce Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration, and the Department of the Interior.
II. ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Seemingly petty assertions of bureaucratic authority resulted in deci-
sions against the Department of the Interior and the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare. Both agencies were overruled on the ground of
abuse of discretion. A third case discussed in this section involved the Inter-
state Commerce Commission.
A. Winkler v. Andrus
In Wzkler v. Andrus,4 the plaintiff challenged a decision of the Interior
Board of Land Appeals, which had upheld on a technicality, the Depart-
ment of Interior's rejection of Winkler's bid for an oil and gas lease. Winkler
had completed the department's required entry card to make his bid and
had stamped it with the name of his insurance company, J.A. Winkler
Agency. Subsequently, the Bureau of Land Management rejected the bid
on the ground that the word "agency" implied that the bid was made by a
corporation and the paperwork required for a corporate bid had not been
completed. 5 The plaintiff maintained that he had inadvertently stamped
the bid card with his insurance agency stamp but had signed the card as an
1. 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979).
2. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
4. 594 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1979).
5. Id at 776.
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individual. 6 The trial court found for.the Interior Board of Land Appeals.7
On appeal, the Court distinguished two earlier Tenth Circuit opinions,
Ballard E Spencer Trust, Inc. v. Morton8 and Shearn v. Andrus, 9 which were de-
cided in favor of the Department. In both cases, the opinion stated, serious
infractions of the regulations governing bid submissions were involved. ' 0 In
contrast, the court found that Winkler involved no actual violation of a regu-
lation, and the use of the word "agency" in the insurance company stamp
would "not in the least degree bring to mind a corporation."'"
In finding the board's decision to be arbitrary, Judge Doyle implied
that what was really at the heart of the dispute was a determination by the
government to uphold its initial finding, regardless of the facts. The opinion
stated that after the Department of the Interior discovered Winkler's
"agency" was not a corporation it tried to find an alternative ground for
refusing to consider his bid, "and did so as if it was determined to deny [the
bid] regardless of the facts."'
12
A possible explanation for the decision, Judge Doyle continued, was
found in the department's brief. Upholding the denial would minimize
challenges to rulings of the board in the future. The court stated that
"[jludicial decisions are not made so as to discourage assertion of rights in
court. . . . It is not sound to assume that a citizen will accept as the last
word an adverse ruling such as this; one which is founded on a trivial and
inconsequential point."'
3
The court noted in Winkler that provisions of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA)' 4 were the basis for the court's jurisdiction to determine the
appeal.' 5 The comment is interesting when compared to a discussion of a
similar jurisdictional issue in Vukonich v. Civil Service Commission,' 6 decided by
the same court just a few months previously. The opinion in Vukonich stated
in a footnote' 7 that a 1977 Supreme Court opinion' 8 had held that the APA
no longer affords independent subject matter jurisdiction for judicial review
of agency actions.' 9 In comparison, the court in Wik/ler ignored the jurisdic-
tional problem.
B. Health Systems Agency of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Norman
As in Winkler, an inflexible approach to an agency's rules provided the
6. Id at 776-77.
7. Id. at 777.
8. 544 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1976).
9. No. 77-1228 (10th Cir. Sept. 19, 1977).
10. 594 F.2d at 777.
11. Id
12. Id
13. Id at 778.
14. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
15. 594 F.2d at 776.
16. 589 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1978). The jurisdictional issue in Vukonich is discussed in PART
III: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND JURISDICTION.
17. Id at 496 n.1.
18. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
19. 589 F.2d at 496 n.1 (1978).
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basis for overruling a government decision in Health Systems Agency of
Oklahoma, Inc. v. Norman .
20
The plaintiff, a nonprofit private corporation, sought to be designated
as a planning, policymaking, and advisory body for Oklahoma health pro-
grams. 2 ' Under a federal law, 22 the designation was required to receive fed-
eral grants through the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW). The plaintiff was required under HEW rules to submit an applica-
tion for designation as the planning agency by January 19, 1976. Although
the application was in final form by the required date, a printing delay made
it virtually impossible to submit it to the HEW regional office in Dallas,
Texas by the close of business on the deadline date.
2 3
HEW approved an extension of the deadline until 8 a.m. the next day.
An employee of the plaintiff flew to Dallas, arriving after midnight. He
asked the hotel to awaken him at 6:30 a.m.; however, this was not done and
the employee overslept. The failure to awaken on time caused a 55-minute
delay in submission of the application. An HEW representative said the
application would not be considered with those that had been submitted on
time, but it might be considered later. HEW claimed it had no provision for
waiving its own deadline.
2 4
Citing a Supreme Court case, 25 Judge McKay stated the general rule is
that a court or an administrative body always has the discretion to relax its
own procedural rules. 26 The date fixed for the submission of the applica-
tions was "wholly arbitrary. '2 7 The court noted that HEW had directed its
regional offices to interpret the deadline without undue rigidity so applica-
tions in final form by the deadline would be accepted, even though they
were not turned in on time.
28
Noting that there had been a "lengthy and troubled history on the mat-
ter," the court directed the HEW regional office to make detailed findings
when it reconsidered the case. 29 The government .rgued that, if the court
found for the plaintiff, the only appropriate measure of recovery would be
the plaintiff's costs in preparing its application. The Tenth Circuit ruled
instead that HEW was required to accept the application, process it, and
consider the application of the plaintiff along with that of the successful
agency. The applications were to be considered on remand on the basis of
their merits in light of events at the time of the original consideration by
HEW.
30
The opinion conceded that recovery of preparation costs is ordinarily
the proper measure of damages in an action based on agency noncompliance
20. 589 F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1978).
21. Id at 493.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 300(k) (1976).
23. 589 F.2d at 488.
24. Id at 488-89.
25. American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532 (1970).
26. 589 F.2d at 489.
27. Id at 490.
28. Id at 491.
29. Id at 492.
30. Id at 492-93.
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with bidding provisions. However, the court thought that the plaintiff was
entitled to more consideration than would be given an ordinary bidder on a
contract for profit. The opinion noted that the plaintiff was an "advisory
body somewhat unique to our political system. . . . A Health Systems
Agency is virtually quasi-governmental in function and is therefore vastly
different from a government contractor or grant recipient. '3 1 In distinguish-
ing the case from those in which the amounts of damages were found to be
bidders' preparation costs, the court cited a 1971 District of Columbia Court
of Appeals decision 32 in which the court found that injunctive relief was
available to a disappointed bidder.
33
In a footnote which may be of prospective significance to many agen-
cies, the court placed an affirmative duty on the government in dealing with
the public. "In this day of bureaucratic proliferation, . . . it would be virtu-
ally impossible for private individuals to find the information that would
permit them reliably to deal with public officials. The government is in the
best position to find such information and bring it forward."
34
C Cape Air Freight, Inc. v. United States
In Cape Air Freighi, Inc. v. United States,35 the Tenth Circuit set aside
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which had adopted
an administrative law judge's (ALJ) findings without modification. The
court found the orders erroneous, arbitrary, and unreasonable, 36 and found
that the ICC had abused its discretion in refusing to accept an offer of settle-
ment made by Cape and accepted by the ICC's Bureau of Enforcement.
37
After the agency's enforcement bureau had agreed to accept the settlement,
the ALJ denied the offer and the ICC entered cease and desist orders as the
ALJ had recommended.
38
Proceedings before the agency began with a petition filed by nine motor
carriers, all competitors of the plaintiff, seeking cancellation or modification
of Cape certificates on the ground that Cape had not actually operated
under them, but was a franchising operation. 39 After hearings, the ALJ ren-
dered an initial decision which held that Cape had been operating unlaw-
fully by utilizing "agents" in the performance of its transportation services
without maintaining substantial responsibility and control in violation of the
Interstate Commerce Act.4° Cape was ordered to discontinue all use of
agents, and directed to use only employees, terminals, and vehicles under its
control and supervision. The ICC affirmed the initial decision and Cape
appealed.
4 '
31. Id at 493.
32. M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seamans, 455 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
33. 589 F.2d at 493.
34. I at 491 n.7.
35. 586 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1978).
36. Id at 181.
37. Id at 182.
38. Id at 172.
39. d at 176.
40. 49 U.S.C. §§ 303, 306, 309, 316 (1976).
41. 586 F.2d at 177.
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Cape moved for dismissal of the complaint based on its settlement offer,
which had included a provision for changing Cape's working arrangements
with "agents" to give the company substantial control and responsibility.
The changes related to banking, equipment identification, insurance, em-
ployee supervision, and document execution. A previous ICC order had dis-
missed other allegations against Cape. Among them was one alleging Cape's
"willful failure" to comply with the Act. Only allegations of Cape's failure
to exercise control and responsibility over its agents had been sustained.
4 2
Intervening complainants refused Cape's offer of settlement and again
requested revocation of Cape's certificates based on investigations by the Bu-
reau of Enforcement. The ALJ's initial decision referred to changes pro-
posed by Cape but concluded that they were insufficient to institute control
and responsibility. The ALJ found Cape's use of agents to be in violation of
the Act and ordered that all such operations cease.
43
The Tenth Circuit reduced the issues to two: 1) Cape's alleged failure
to exercise adequate control over its operations, and 2) the refusal of the ICC
to accept the settlement offer.44 The Tenth Circuit found the ICC require-
ments of control and responsibility valid and enforceable. In addition, it
upheld ICC findings that Cape failed to exercise necessary control and ruled
that the violations were supported by substantial evidence.
45
Despite the finding that the control and responsibility requirements
were valid, the Tenth Circuit found the ICC order upholding the ALJ's deci-
sion to be an abuse of discretion. The court based this finding on the ration-
ale that the discretion exercised by the ICC in determining the proper
remedy should have taken into account the entire record.46 The court over-
ruled the ICC's total prohibition against the use of agents. Judge Barrett
found that the Interstate Commerce Act establishes the right of a carrier to
augment its equipment and personnel through lease agreements.
47
Citing Gilberiville Trucking Co., Inc. v. United States,48 in which the
Supreme Court observed the power of the ICC to be corrective, not puni-
tive,49 the Tenth Circuit expressed its belief that the agency's acceptance of
the settlement offer would have accomplished the required remedial goal.
The effect of the cease and desist order was to deny the plaintiff the use of
agents under any circumstances. The ICC was directed to undertake pro-
ceedings to accept Cape's offer subject to directives deemed necessary to
eliminate Cape's failure to exercise control and responsibility as required by
42. Id at 173.
43. Id at 177.
44. Id at 178.
45. Id. at 180.
46. 586 F.2d at 180, 181-82. See Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S.
156 (1962).
47. 586 F.2d at 181 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 304(e) (1976)). See generally American Trucking
Ass'ns, Inc. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953); Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. v. Pitt
County Transp. Co., 492 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 983 (1975); Alford v.
Major, 470 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1972); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Alterman Transp. Lines, Inc., 465 F.2d
710 (5th Cir. 1972).
48. 371 U.S. 115 (1962).
49. Id at 129-30. See also Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944).
1980]
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the Interstate Commerce Act. 50
III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND JURISDICTION
A government clerk whose promised promotion was snatched away only
moments before a celebration party, lost her attempt to force the Civil Serv-
ice Commission (CSC) to grant her a hearing5 ' in Vukonich v. Civ1l Service
Commission. 52 While noting that the employee's disappointment was caused
by a "running dispute" between the CSC and the Environmental Protection
Agency, the worker's employer,53 the court found that the clerk was not enti-
tled to a hearing before being denied the promotion. Judge McKay stated
that, since Civil Service appointments take effect only after completion of a
standard form that had not been filled out in the plaintiff's case, there had
been no promotion. Therefore, the court did not reach the issue of whether
a hearing was required.5 4 In support of its ruling, the court cited a federal
regulation that requires hearings only in cases in which there is removal,
suspension, furlough without pay, or reduction in rank or pay of a federal
worker.
55
The plaintiff had alleged jurisdiction only under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). The court dealt with this jurisdictional issue in a foot-
note. 56 After the plaintiffs case had been brought, the Supreme Court in
Califano v. Sanders,57 held that the APA does not provide a basis for in-
dependent subject matter jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit found that the
failure to allege another basis of jurisdiction was not fatal because jurisdic-
tion could be based on the federal question statute,58 even though it was not
alleged in the complaint. In support of its independent finding of jurisdic-
tion, the court cited a Second Circuit decision.
59
50. 586 F.2d at 180-82.
51. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83 (1974), in which the Supreme Court found the
government is entitled to the "widest latitude" in matters involving its employees. For a discus-
sion of the "watered down" due process required in government employee discharge cases, see
Martin, The Improper Discharge of a Federal Employee by a Constitutionally Permissible Process. The OEO
Case, 28 AD. L. REV. 27 (1976); Comment, Constitutional Law: No Hearing Required Pror to Dsmis-
salfor Cause of Nonprobationag, Federal Employee, 59 MINN. L. REV. 421 (1974).
52. 589 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1978).
53. Id. at 495-96.
54. Id at 496-97.
55. Id. at 497 (citing 5 C.F.R. §§ 752.101-.202 (1978)).
56. 589 F.2d at 496 n. 1. Jurisdiction was alleged on the basis of the appeals provisions of
the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
57. 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). The statute provides that district courts have jurisdiction in
cases arising under federal law. The statute states that there is no requirement that more than
$10,000 be in controversy in cases involving federal officers or agencies acting in their official
capacities.
59. 589 F.2d at 496 n.1 (citing Harary v. Blumenthal, 555 F.2d 1113, 1115 n.1 (2d Cir.
1977)). Ste also Hoefferle Truck Sales, Inc. v. Divco-Wayne Corp., 523 F.2d 543, 549 (7th Cir.
1975); Paynes v. Lee, 377 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1967); Quality Beverage Co. v. Sun-Drop Sales
Corp. of America, 291 F. Supp. 92, 95 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
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IV. FAA PILOT RULES
Two pilots were unsuccessful in their separate attempts to upset deci-
sions of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
4. Loomis v. McLucas
The 70-year-old plaintiff in Loomis v. McLucas,6° whose application for a
private pilot's license had been denied. in 1975, had lost a previous appeal to
the same court in 1977.61 The Tenth Circuit, in the 1977 decision, affirmed
the FAA's denial of a license on medical grounds after the plaintiff had un-
dergone surgery and received an artificial heart valve.
6 2
After repeated attempts to obtain a flying certificate, the plaintiff filed
an action in federal district court, seeking a writ of mandamus 63 to force the
FAA to reissue the license. The district court dimissed the action.
64
Judge Logan stated that federal statutes require an appeal from an ad-
verse determination of the FAA to be made directly to the Courts of Ap-
peals. 65 Neither the former pilot's advanced age nor the delay cuased by a
crowded Court of Appeals docket were found to be enough to permit the
court to ignore the statutory appeals process.66 The Tenth Circuit noted
that there were no important constitutional issues raised that would justify
the Tenth Circuit hearing the case prematurely. The court also found it
could not excuse exhaustion of appropriate judicial remedies, since no irrep-
arable harm was threatened.
6 7
B. Gray v. FAA
In Gray v. FAA, 68 the court rejected arguments against an FAA rule
requiring mandatory retirement for commercial airline pilots. The regula-
tion, known as the Age-60 Rule,69 was promulgated to safeguard the public
from risks associated with diminished ability in older pilots. 70 Gray, who
flew for Continental Airlines, had petitioned the FAA for an exemption from
the rule. He contended his physical condition justified the exemption, which
was denied by the agency. The plaintiff alleged that it was an abuse of dis-
cretion to deny the exemption, 7 and that the federal air surgeon had
demonstrated bias against exempting pilots from the Age-60 Rule. 72
Judge McKay noted that the Second and Seventh Circuits had found
60. 598 F.2d 1200 (10th Cir. 1979).
61. Loomis v. McLucas, 553 F.2d 634 (10th Cir. 1977).
62. 598 F.2d at 1201.
63. The plaintiff sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976), which gives district courts
original jurisdiction in actions "in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of
the United States ... to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff."
64. 598 F.2d at 1201.
65. 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (1976) provides that FAA appeals be made to the Courts of Appeals.
66. 598 F.2d at 1201.
67. Id at 1202.
68. 594 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1979).
69. 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (1979).
70. 24 Fed. Reg. 9767 (1959).
71. 594 F.2d at 794.
72. Id at 795.
19801
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against pilots who had challenged the rule on exactly the same grounds as
Gray. 73 However, while upholding the agency, Judge McKay noted that
failure to grant exemptions could become an abuse of discretion in the fu-
ture. "At some point, the state of the medical art may become so compel-
lingly supportive of a capacity to determine functional age equivalents in
individual cases that it would be an abuse of discretion not to grant an ex-
emption.
'74
V. EXHAUSTION AND RIPENESS
The Tenth Circuit rejected a challenge to federal regulations prohibit-
ing discrimination on the basis of gender when it found in St. Regis Paper Co.
v. Marshall,75 that the plaintiff, a private employer, had failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.76 St. Regis sought review of the regulations, poli-
cies and practices of the Secretary of Labor, the General Services Adminis-
tration (GSA), and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
(OFCCP).77
The GSA had ruled that St. Regis had deviated from its affirmative
action program in the employment of women at its Libby, Montana plant,
and advised the company that it could be passed over for future government
contracts. However, the government had agreed not to pass over the plain-
tiff for any contract while the matter was pending before the agency. The
plaintiff filed an action in the district court prior to the time that an admin-
istrative hearing was held.
78
Citing Myers v. Bethlehem Corp. ,79 the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of
the action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.8 0 In resolution of
the plaintiffs argument that the issues raised questions of statutory interpre-
tation and the constitutionality of federal regulations,8 ' Judge Lewis stated
that agency review is desirable even when pure questions of law are involved
in an appeal from an administrative decision. A Seventh Circuit decision,
Unroyal, Inc. v. Marshall,82 was cited in support of this rationale. The court
also stated that prior interpretation of a statute by an agency is necessary as
an aid to the court on judicial review.8 3 Such interpretation by the agency
provides a better record for the court to review.
84
The Tenth Circuit also rejected an argument that the plaintiff would be
73. Id at 795 (citing Rombough v. FAA, 594 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1979), and Starr v. FAA,
589 F.2d 307 (7th Cir. 1978)).
74. 594 F.2d at 795.
75. 591 F.2d 612 (10th Cir. 1979).
76. For discussions of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, see K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES §§ 20.01-.08 (1976); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW §§ 165-75 (1976).
77. 591 F.2d at 612.
78. Id at 613.
79. 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
80. 591 F.2d at 614.
81. Id at 614.
82. 579 F.2d 1060 (7th Cir. 1978).
83. 591 F.2d at 614.
84. Id (citing McGrath v. Weinberger, 541 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denid, 430 U.S.
933 (1977)). See also McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479 (1971).
[Vol. 57:2
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subjected to needless expense if required to pursue an administrative rem-
edy. Referring to a Ninth Circuit decision, 5 the court stated that expense
was no excuse for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.8 6 In addition,
the court found that the issue was not ripe for judicial decision, since "fur-
ther and adequate administrative relief has been requested but not ex-
hausted."
8 7
St. Regis argued that it would be subjected to irreparable injury other
than expense. The injury alleged was that some federal employees had
stated to government contracting officers that St. Regis was not eligible for
government contracts. The court found that assurances by the OFCCP di-
rector that the plaintiff would not be passed over were enough to assure that
there would be no irreparable injury.88
VI. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR DECISIONS
The Department of the Interior was upheld in two unrelated decisions,
and overruled on the grounds of abuse of discretion in a third case, W4inkler v.
Andis,8 9 discussed in PART II.
A. Johnson v. Kleppe
The Tenth Circuit ruled inJohnson v. Kleppe9° that determinations made
by the Secretary of the Interior concerning the legal heirs of Indians dying
intestate are not subject to judicial review.9 ' The plaintiffs, who were rela-
tives determined to be ineligible to inherit by intestate succession, contended
the secretary had misinterpreted Oklahoma intestacy laws relating to inheri-
tance by relatives of the half blood. The court agreed with the Department
of the Interior that a federal statute requires that the determination of the
secretary be final. 92 Judge McWilliams cited a 1926 Supreme Court case
93
in finding the action should be dismissed because the court did not have
jurisdiction.
94
The plaintiffs argued that jurisdiction was appropriate under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA). 95 While recognizing that the modern
view favors judicial review,96 the court quoted from the APA to establish
that the act does not apply where precluded by statute.
97
85. California v. FTC, 549 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1977).
86. ee Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., Inc., 415 U.S. 1 (1974); Aircraft &
Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947).
87. 591 F.2d at 614-15.
88. Id at 615.
89. 594 F.2d 775. See text accompanying notes 4-19 supra.
90. 596 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1979).
91. Id at 951.
92. 25 U.S.C. § 372 (1976) provides that the secretary's decision "shall be final and conclu-
sive."
93. First Moon v. White Tail, 270 U.S. 243 (1926).
94. 596 F.2d at 952.
95. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1976).
96. 596 F.2d at 952. Se Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
97. 596 F.2d at 952 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976)).
1980]
DENVER LAWJOURNAL
B. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States
A Colorado special district was unsuccessful in its attempt to require the
Department of the Interior and other defendants98 to include it in negotia-
tions for a contract to transport water in Colorado River Water Conservation Dis-
trict v. United States.99  The district had sought to be included in the
negotiations by submitting an environmental impact statement.10 0 The ne-
gotiations were for a contract under which the federal government would
carry water from the Western Slope of Colorado to the Eastern Slope
through the surplus capacity of a federal water project.' 0 1
In finding against the plaintiff, the court interpreted the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969102 as requiring participation by interested par-
ties only when a "major federal action" was involved. 10 3 Applying the
rational basis test, the trial court appropriately granted summary judgment
since there was a reasonable ground for the agency's determination that the
action, which was not final, did not warrant participation by interested par-
ties. However, had the action been a major one, the plaintiff would have
been permitted to file a statement.I°4
Quoting from a District of Columbia Circuit Court decision, 10 5 Judge
Barrett indicated that it would be burdensome to require agencies to permit
public participation in all actions of the government, particularly where, as
in the Colorado River, the agency action was preliminary, and participation
could prove to be "more disruptive than beneficial."'
10 6
VII. REVIEW OF MILITARY DECISIONS
Following precedent set by the Eighth and Second Circuits, 10 7 the court
found that only limited judicial review is permitted in appeals from military
decisions refusing to allow doctors to resign from the armed forces after re-
ceiving deferments to obtain post-graduate medical training.' 8 In Karlin v.
Reed, the plaintiff received a deferment under a voluntary medical military
98. Defendants also included the City and County of Denver, Colo., and the cities of Colo-
rado Springs, Colo., and Aurora, Colo. 593 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1977).
99. d. The case was decided in 1977. The court granted a motion to publish the opinion
in 1979. Letter from Howard K. Phillips, clerk of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, to recipi-
ents of the opinion (March 13, 1979).
100. On environmental impact statements, see Wright, New Judctal Requisttes for Informal
Rulemaking: Implications for the Environmental Impact Statement Process, 29 AD. L. REV. 59 (1977);
Note, Appropriate Scope of an Environmental Impact Statement: The Interrelationship of Impacts, 1976
DUKE L.J. 623; Comment, Four Years of Environmental Impact Statements: A Review of Agenc Admin-
istration of NEPA, 8 AKRON L. REV. 545 (1975); Comment, Planning Level and Program Impact
Statements Under the National Environmental Policy Act:. A Defmitional Approach, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
124 (1975).
101. 593 F.2d at 908.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
103. 593 F.2d at 909 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976)).
104. Id
105. Easton Util. Comm'n v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 424 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
106. 593 F.2d at 911.
107. West v. Chafee, 560 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1977); Applewick v. Hoffman, 540 F.2d 404 (8th
Cir. 1976); Ornato v. Hoffman, 546 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976); Roth v. Laird, 446 F.2d 855 (2d Cir.
1971).
108. Karlin v. Reed, 584 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1978).
[Vol. 57:2
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program, the Berry Plan, which permitted him to complete his residency
training before being ordered to active duty. After finishing his residency, he
took a job as a clinical researcher in cancer chemotherapy in Chicago. Kar-
lin's resignation from the military stated that his work was essential to the
community. The military had refused his resignation on the ground that his
services urgently were needed at an Air Force base in Texas. 10 9
Karlin filed a petition seeking writs of habeas corpus and mandamus,
and asserting jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act. A pre-
liminary injunction was issued by the trial court, which found that the mili-
tary had acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The issue on appeal was the
applicable standard of review in cases involving the military decision-mak-
ing process. " 10
In finding that the military had acted properly, the court distinguished
the Berry Plan cases from those in which review was sought regarding Selec-
tive Service Board refusals to grant to civilians classifications as conscientious
objectors. I 'I Quoting from a Second Circuit opinion, 112 Chief Judge Seth
found that the decision was one that was purely within the purview of the
military and, therefore, not subject to judicial scrutiny. 1 3 The court also
cited, in support of its conclusion on the level of review, two Supreme Court
cases dealing with judicial review of military personnel matters, Parker v.
Levy 1 14 and Orofv. Willoughby. 1 5 In conducting its own personnel matters,
the military must state only adequate military reasons. The applicable
guidelines are the Department of Defenses's own regulations, which were
applied in considering Karlin's appeal through military channels." 
6
Although the opinion indicated there is a difference between the Berry
Plan cases and those involving conscientious objectors, it did not explain the
nature of that difference. In the conscientious objector cases, the distinguish-
ing fact appears to be that there is no doubt of the inductee's civilian status
since he has not enlisted in the armed forces in any manner. In contrast, in
the Berry Plan cases, there is an agreement between the doctor and the mili-
tary under which the physician has obligated himself to serve in the mili-
tary. 1i7 This agreement would appear to give the Berry Plan doctor the
status of a member of the military.
VIII. ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF A REGULATORY SCHEME
A ski instructor lost an attempt to reverse a Department of Agriculture
decision denying him permission to operate a ski school on National Forest
109. Id. at 366.
110. Id at 366-67.
111. Id at 367. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
112. Roth v. Laird, 446 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1971).
113. 584 F.2d at 367.
114. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
115. 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
116. 584 F.2d at 368. For a case in which a closer review was made of a military decision,
see Schwartz v. Covington, 341 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1965).
117. See West v. Chafee, 560 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1977).
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Service land near Aspen, Colorado in Sabrn v. Berglund." 8 The case was
before the Circuit for the second time. 1 9 Several of the plaintiff's arguments
had been rejected on the first appeal; 120 however, the case had been re-
manded to the district court to ascertain whether there was a rational basis
for the denial of the request for a special use permit. One issue which had
not been considered in the 1975 appeal was whether there was a violation of
the federal antitrust laws in denial of the permit.
12'
The plaintiff had sought a special permit for an area already under per-
mit for winter sports. The Forest Service rejected the request on the ground
that it would not authorize a ski school without the existing permitee's con-
sent. 
1 2 2
Citing an 1871 Supreme Court case, 123 the court stated that Congress
has plenary power over the federal public lands. And it has the ability to
delegate that power to the executive branch.' 24 Not only does the Secretary
have "extremely broad powers," stated Judge Doyle, but the Administrative
Procedure Act 1 25 "demands" only limited judicial review.
1 26
The court indicated there was no violation of antitrust laws because ski
areas compete with each other for the public's business. ' 2 7 However, even if
such competition were not sufficient, there are cases upholding regulatory
schemes when not operated competitively. Quoting from a treatise on anti-
trust law, the court found that a regulatory scheme generally supersedes the
antitrust laws.
128
The court was explicit in stating that it was not condoning the ski per-
mit system as "the best that could be conceived had there been more inten-
sive effort."' 29 However, even though the court might not condone the
system, it was not within the court's power to overturn the program on the
ground that it was not the best that could be conceived, since the power to
make such regulations had been delegated to the executive branch, not to
118. 585 F.2d 955 (10th Cir. 1978).
119. Sabin v. Butz, 515 F.2d 1061 (10th Cir. 1975), afd sub noni. Sabin v. Berglund, 585
F.2d 955 (10th Cir. 1978). (The name of the case changed because there was a different individ-
ual serving as Secretary of Agriculture.)
120. 585 F.2d at 957.
121. Id The issue of whether antitrust laws or a regulatory scheme controls has arisen in
federal cases in which there is alleged an antitrust violation involving a regulated company or
industry. In such cases, the issue is whether primary jurisdiction to decide if there has been an
antitrust violation rests with the federal courts or with the regulatory agency. See K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 19.06 (1976); Botein, Prinayjuntrdiction: The Need
for Better Court/Ageny Interaction, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 867 (1976).
122. 585 F.2d at 955-56.
123. Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. 92, 99 (1871).
124. 585 F.2d at 957-58 (citing in support of the delegation doctrine Best v. Humboldt
Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963) and Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970),
afsdsub nor. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)).
125. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1976).
126. 585 F.2d at 959. Judge Doyle found such narrow review to be mandated by 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (1976), which provides for a reviewing court to set aside agency action that is "arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."
127. 585 F.2d at 959.
128. Id at 960 (quoting from L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST
(1977)).






The Tenth Circuit decided a significant case involving searches by ad-
ministrative agencies. '3 1 In Savina Home Industries, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor,132
the court found that the exclusionary rule1 33 did not apply retroactively to a
search' 34 conducted under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA) of 1970.135
Several constitutional issues were raised in Savzna,' 3 6 an action brought
by a contractor who had been cited for OSHA violations. 137 The most im-
portant of these were: 1) whether, considering the Supreme Court opinion
in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. ,a38 the exclusionary rule should be applied to
evidence seized in a warrantless OSHA search; and 2) if so, whether it should
be applied retroactively to a warrantless inspection that had occurred three
years prior to the Marshall decision.' 39 The Tenth Circuit found that the
rule did apply, but that its application was prospective only."40 The deci-
sion therefore marks a split of authority between the circuits, since the Ninth




131. On the topic of administrative searches generally, see McManis & McManis, Srcturn=g
Administrative Inspections. Is There any Warrantfor a Search Warrant, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 942 (1977);
Rothstein & Rothstein, Administrative Searches and Seizures: Whatever Happened to Camara and See?,
50 WASH. L. REV. 341 (1975).
132. 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979).
133. The exclusionary rule provides that evidence illegally seized may not be used in a
subsequent criminal prosecution. The rule also has been applied in the context of administra-
tive searches. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541 (1967). The rule is based on the fourth amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
On the application of the rule in the criminal context, see LaFave, Improving Police Perform-
ance Through the Erclusunaqy Rule-Part Z. Current Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. REV.
391 (1965); Oaks, Studying the Exclu inaqy Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665
(1970); Thompson, Unconstitutional Search and Seizure and the Myth of Harmless Error, 42 NOTRE
DAME L. 457 (1967).
134. 594 F.2d at 1363-64.
135. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
136. 594 F.2d at 1358. In addition to the exclusionary rule issue, the court considered
whether there had been constitutional violations under the sixth amendment rights to confron-
tation, cross-examination, and trial by jury; whether there had been an unlawful delegation of
legislative and judicial authority; whether there had been a violation of due process; and
whether the plaintiff had standing to challenge the OSHA scheme. All issues were decided
against the plaintiff. Id at 1365-67.
137. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976). See Dreusche, Fourth Amendment Implications of Warrantless
Occupational Safety and Health Act Inspections, 82 DICK. L. REV. 773 (1978); Levin, OSHA and the
Sixth Amentdment: When is a "Civil Penalty" Criminal in Ef ct,', 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1013
(1978); Note, Warrantless Nonconsensual Searches Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 93 (1977).
138. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). Although the Court found in Marshall that an OSHA inspection
made without a warrant was a fourth amendment violation, it did not decide whether the
warrant requirement would be applied retroactively. A decision on retroactivity was not neces-
sary, since Barlow had refused to admit the OSHA inspector and, therefore, no evidence was
seized. Id at 310.
139. 594 F.2d at 1363.
140. Id at 1363-65.
141. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 586 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1978).
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The court heavily relied on precedents in the criminal area in deciding
against retroactive application of the rule. Judge McKay noted that the rule
had never been applied retroactively by the Supreme Court.' 4 2 He further
noted that, considering the state of the law at the time of the inspection, the
inspector could not have known that a warrantless search was unconstitu-
tional. Citing United States v. Peltier,143 the court found that "actual or con-
structive knowledge" of the unconstitutionality of a search was essential to a
retroactive application of the exclusionary rule. 144
A three-pronged test has been employed in determining the retroactive
application of "new" constitutional rules. This test, as set out in Stoval o.
Denno, 145 requires the reviewing court to consider the purpose served by the
new rule, the extent of reliance on the prior standard, and the effect of a
retroactive application on the administration of justice. 46 Since the court
found that the Marshall rule did not apply retroactively, it did not reach the
issue of whether the search in Sav'na had been, as the government contended,
consensual.'
47
Another issue was whether the plaintiff had been given sufficient notice
of the OSHA standards involved in the citation. 148 The court found that,
because the standards were published in the Code of Federal Regulations,
and therefore were "a matter of public record," there had been no due proc-
ess violation. Furthermore, the plaintiff had received notice of the violations
through the citation and complaint issued by the inspector.' 49 The court
noted that it had rejected the same due process contentions in Clarkson Con-
struction Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 150 and found
that Savina did not have standing to ask the court to reconsider its posi-
tion.' 5'
In Savina the court also found that the plaintiff did not have standing to
raise the issue of the legality of the penalty portion of the OSHA scheme,
since Savina had not been assessed the penalty permitted by the statutory
scheme. 152 The penalty provision permits the agency to increase an em-
ployer's fine when a citation is challenged. Citing Sierra Club v. Morton,' 53 the
court based its conclusion on the standing issue on the fact that Savina's first
amendment free speech rights were not "chilled" by the provision enough to
142. 594 F.2d at 1364 (citing United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 541).
143. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
144. 594 F.2d at 1364. For a case in which the rule was not applied retroactively, see Lin-
kletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
145. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
146. Id at 297. See also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); United States v. Reda, 563 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 973 (1978); United States v. Montgomery, 558 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1977).
147. 594 F.2d at 1361. The court stated in a footnote that the plaintiff had not been able to
develop its fourth amendment contentions regarding the nonconsensual nature of the search
because OHSRC had ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to resolve constitutional issues. Id
at 1361 n.3.
148. Id. at 1365.
149. Id.
150. 531 F.2d 451, 456 (10th Cir. 1976).
151. 594 F.2d at 1366.
152. Id The penalty provision is at 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1976).
153. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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discourage the petitioner from pursuing its appeal.' 5 4
The problem with this holding is that, if a petitioner who has not actu-
ally been assessed an increased fine is not allowed to challenge the statute,
then there may be no one with standing to do so. The agency's statutory
authority to assess the higher fine when an appeal is taken may indeed have
a chilling effect on some employers, who simply choose not to contest cita-
tions. These chilled employers therefore are not involved in any appeal
process. And, when citations are contested, the Commission may never in-
voke the penalty, which will mean that no "contesting" employers have
standing either. If this were the case, then there would be no employer with
standing to challenge the scheme. In finding that the petitioner lacked
standing to contest the penalty statute, the court avoided having to resolve
whether that portion of the Act was legal.
Savina also contended its sixth amendment rights of confrontation,
cross-examination, and trial by jury155 were infringed. In summarily dispos-
ing of the claims, Judge McKay noted that the plaintiff had cross-examined
the sole government witness at an administrative hearing, and that the jury
trial guarantee applies only in the criminal setting.156 The plaintiff also had
argued that the judicial and legislative branches' authority had been unlaw-
fully delegated in the OSHA scheme. The court, again finding for the gov-
ernment, noted that the "federal courts have long recognized as
constitutionally valid broad delegations of adjudicatory and rulemaking au-
thority to administrative agencies."'
15 7
X. THE ICC CASES
The Tenth Circuit decided three unrelated cases in which the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) was the defendant. A fourth case involving
the ICC, Cape Air Freight, Inc. v. United States,S is discussed in PART II.
A. Sterling Colorado Beef Co. v. United States
In Sterling Colorado Beef Co. v. United States, 159 the Tenth Circuit upheld
the district court reversal of an ICC decision to deny damages from railroad
companies to a Colorado meat packer for freight charges to the east coast.
The basis for the claim was a comparison of the rates charged the plaintiff
with those charged other shippers who were situated farther from Chicago
and the east coast. While the ICC found the rate charged the plaintiff to
154. 594 F.2d at 1366.
155. U.S. CONST., amend. VI.
156. 594 F.2d at 1366.
157. Id. at 1367. On delegation of power, see, e.g., FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346
U.S. 86 (1953); Clarkson Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 531 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1976); Frank Irey Jr.,
Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200 (3rd Cir. 1975), afd, 430 U.S. 442 (1977). Se also K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES §§ 2.00-.14 (1976); Fisher, Delegatig Power to the
President, 19 J. PUB. L. 251 (1970).
158. 586 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1978). The Tenth Circuit during its 1978-79 term decided two
cases with the same name, Cape Air Freight, Inc. o. United States. Although the parties were the
same, the issues were different and unrelated.
159. 599 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1979).
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Chicago was unlawful and, therefore, warranted damages, it denied relief for
rates to points east of Chicago, since Sterling did not show proof directed
specifically to those rates. By the time the case reached the Tenth Circuit,
the ICC had changed its position, indicating it agreed with the district court.
The appeal was taken by the railroads.16°
Chief Judge Seth noted that the issue was reduced to an application of a
Supreme Court case, Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sullivan. 161 The Tenth Cir-
cuit agreed with the trial court that the Great Northern decision is a recogni-
tion of the principle that damages cannot be recovered in the absence of
injury. However, in the instant case, there were damages that would justify
recovery, because the plaintiff was charged the same rate as other shippers
who were allowed to send shipments farther distances for the same rates,
injuring Sterling's competitive position.' 62 The court noted that its holding
actually supported the ICC's position, since, by the time the case was heard
on appeal, the Commission had acknowledged that the record at the agency
level supported Sterling's claim.63
B. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc. v. ICC
In Rocky Mountain Motor Tanff Bureau, Inc. v. ICC,'6 the court upheld an
ICC order165 restricting motor common carriers from applying pickup and
delivery charges to certain non-commercial locations, and requiring delivery
notification for shipments to such locations. Petitioners challenged the order
on the ground that the ICC utilized its rulemaking authority in a ratemak-
ing proceeding, rendering the rule invalid. Secondarily, the order's rational
basis was attacked.166
The Commission claimed it had the authority under the Interstate
Commerce Act 167 to investigate industry practices and make rules in the
public interest.' 68 Intervening motor tariff bureaus charged that the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act' 69 required an evidentiary hearing because carri-
ers' rates were challenged. They argued that an adjudicatory hearing was
necessary to eliminate a rate already in effect.'
70
The court noted that the APA permits both rulemaking and adjudica-
tory proceedings before the ICC. Rulemaking is concerned with future and
general policies, while adjudicatory proceedings deal with past and present
rights of particular parties. Chief Judge Seth cited United States v. Allegheny-
Ludlum Steel Corp. ,171 in which the Supreme Court held that section 556172 of
160. Id at 366.
161. 294 U.S. 458 (1935).
162. 599 F.2d at 367.
163. Id at 368.
164. 590 F.2d 865 (10th Cir. 1979).
165. Ex Parte No. MC-97, Investigation into actices of Motor Common Camrrs of Property on
Residential and Redtioered Shipments, now codified at 49 C.F.R § 1307.35(d) (1978).
166; 590 F.2d at 868-69.
167. 49 U.S.C. §§ 304(a)(1), (6), (b), and 308(a) (1976).
168. 590 F.2d at 868.
169. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(7) (1976).
170. 590 F.2d at 868.
171. 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
172. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(2) (1976).
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the APA demands an evidentiary hearing only when section 553173 triggers
it, which was not the case here. 174 The choice between rulemaking and ad-
judicatory prioceedings is primarily within the agency's discretion, the court
ruled, citing SEC v. Chenery Corp. 175 In the case at hand, the ICC was not
considering the lawfulness of the plaintiff's particular rates, but only consid-
ering generally whether any charges were permissible, 176 so the proceedings
chosen were properand within its authority.'
77
The court applied the substantial evidence rule, finding the agency's
holding clearly based on substantial evidence. The orders were reviewed
under the standard of Allegheny-Ludlum Steel 
78 and affirmed.1 79
C Cape Air Freight, Inc. v. United States
In Cape Air Freight, Inc. v. United States,180 the court affirmed an ICC
interpretation of a freight motor carrier certificate held by the plaintiff.' 8 '
The issue was whether the operations of Cape were within the authority
granted with respect to routes. 18 2 The court settled the question of whether
Cape was authorized radial or nonradial operations, 183 which determined
the area where transportation was authorized. The court upheld ICC cease
and desist orders 184 which indicated Cape had only radial authority.
Cape's argument for nonradial operations hinged on the placement of a
comma in a clause of its certificate that described its territory. The court
was unimpressed. Describing the result of the petitioner's argument as illogi-
cal because it would place a radial grant between two nonradial grants, the
court upheld the plain meaning interpretation of the ICC Review Board.18 5
Cape argued that the decision was inconsistent with past interpretations,
173. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
174. 590 F.2d at 868.
175. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
176. 590 F.2d at 868.
177. Id at 869. For a discussion of APA requirements for agency rulemaking, seeJudtut'a/
Review of thr Fats in Informal RuLkmaking: A Proposed Standard, 84 YALE L.J. 1750 (1975).
178. 406 U.S. 742, 749. The standard of review on appeal is: "We do not weigh the evi-
dence introduced before the Commission; we do not inquire into the wisdom of the regulations
that the Commission promulgates, and we inquire into the soundness of the reasoning by which
the Commission reaches its conclusions only to ascertain that the latter are rationally sup-
ported."
179. 590 F.2d at 871.
180. 589 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1978).
181. Id at 481.
182. Id at 478.
183. The court distinguished radial from nonradial authority:
Radial authority permits the transportation of freight between points in two or more
geographically described areas but does not permit the transportation of freight be-
tween points located wholly within one of the described areas. This latter transporta-
tion is called cross-haul. For example, a grant of radial authority between points in
state A on the one hand, and, on the other hand, points in states B and C would
permit transportation between states A and B, and between states A and C. It would
not permit transportation between states B and C. A nonradial grant of authority
would permit cross-haul between states B and C. As can readily be seen, nonradial
authority is broader than radial authority.
589 F.2d at 479.
184. Id at 478.
185. Id at 480.
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and was arbitrary. It relied on T1 McCormack Trucking Co. v. United Sates,1 86
in which the absence of a comma determined the limited interpretation of a
phrase in a certificate and a district court held territorial descriptions to be
non-technical. 18 7 The Tenth Circuit designated the words in Cape's certifi-
cate to be words of art and the normal ICC practice.' 8 8
Judge Breitenstein wrote, "An administrative interpretation must be ac-
cepted unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong." Since the
Commission's decision was not "clearly erroneous," the court was required to
accept it. 189
XI. THE OSHA CASES
The Tenth Circuit decided five cases involving violations of the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970.'90 Decisions of the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) were upheld in
two cases. The Commission was reversed in one case, and upheld in part
and reversed in part in another. The fifth case, involving a warrantless in-
spection to search for OSHA violations,' 9 is discussed in PART IX.
A. H-30, Inc. v. Marshall
In H-30, Inc. v. Marshall,192 the Tenth Circuit, setting aside an OSHRC
order, held that the drilling industry practice of allowing employees to ride
an "elevator" attached to a traveling block used to lift pipe was not a recog-
nized hazard in the industry and therefore did not constitute a "serious vio-
lation"' 193 under the "general duty"'194 clause of the Act.
An OSHA inspector issued H-30, Inc. a citation on the basis that con-
struction crane standards in the building industry were applicable to drilling
rig operations in the oil well industry. 195 The inspector's reasoning was that
machinery used in both industries was mechanically or functionally simi-
lar. '9
Chief Judge Seth found that mere similarity in purpose of certain de-
vices used by two industries did not justify applying one industry's accept-
ance of a hazard to another. The court also based its vacating order on
evidence, substantiated by an administrative law judge's findings, that the
186. 251 F. Supp. 526 (D.N.J. 1966), explained on relnew, 298 F. Supp. 39 (D.N.J. 1969).
187. 251 F. Supp. at 531; 298 F. Supp. at 41.
188. 589 F.2d at 481. The Tenth Circuit found that the "words of art" interpretation had
been upheld, citing Cardinale Trucking Co. v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 339 (D.N.J. 1964);
King Van Lines, Inc. v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 551 (D. Kan. 1963); ICC v. Southwest
Freight Lines, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Mo. 1949), aJ'd, 184 F.2d 149 (8th Cir. 1950).
189. 589 F.2d at 581.
190. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
191. Savina Home Indus., Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979).
192. 597 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1979).
193. A serious violation exists "if there is a substantial probability that death or serious
physical harm could result," provided the employer knew or should have known that the prac-
tice in question was a violation. 29 U.S.C. § 666(j) (1976).
194. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1976). The general duty clause is applied to situations in which an
accepted standard in the industry concerned is present. 597 F.2d at 235.




agency did not have a uniform policy regarding such riding practices; in
some areas the practice was not considered hazardous, whereas in others ci-
tations were issued. 197
B. Kent Nowlin Construction Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Commission
The OSHRC was reversed in part in Kent Nowhn Construction Co. v. Occu-
pational Safety & Health Review Commission,' 98 which dealt with the interpre-
tation of certain OSHA regulations. While overturning the Commission's
order for a minor violation of one regulation, the Circuit affirmed the order
for willful violation of another. 199
The petitioner was laying a sewer line in a cavity it had excavated along
a highway. Excavated materials were stored within two feet of the cavity's
edge. Although a ladder was provided, it was not positioned within a 25-
foot walking distance of all employees in the working areas of the cavity.
2 ° °
The issue raised with regard to the minor citation was whether the cav-
ity was considered an "excavation, ' 20 1 for which the regulations do not re-
quire a ladder, or a "trench," 20 2 for which the regulations require that a
ladder be placed "so as to require no more than 25 feet of lateral travel."
20 3
Basing its holding on the fact that there was disagreement among the
Department of Labor's compliance officers, the administrative law judge,
and OSHRC as to which definition was applicable to the cavity,20 4 the Cir-
cuit reversed the Commission's finding that there had been a serious viola-
tion. The court recognized that deference should be accorded to the
Secretary of Labor's interpretation of his own regulations, 20 5 but, citing
Usug v. Kennecott Copper Corp. ,206 indicated that employers should not have
to guess what is intended by a safety regulation. The court further stated
that a penalty should not be imposed for deviation from a standard "the
interpretation of which cannot be agreed upon by those responsible for com-
pelling compliance with it .... ,,207
The willful violation with which petitioner was charged resulted from
197. Id.
198. 593 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979).
199. Id. at 369.
200. Id
201. The term excavation is defined as: "Any manmade cavity or depression in the earth's
surface, including its sides, walls, or faces, formed by earth removal and producing unsupported
earth conditions by reasons of the excavation. If installed forms or similar structures reduce the
depth-to-width relationship, an excavation may become a trench." 29 C.F.R. § 1926.653(f)
(1978).
202. The term trench is defined as: "A narrow excavation made below the surface of the
ground. In general, the depth is greater than the width, but the width of a trench is not greater
than 15 feet." 29 C.F.R. § 1926.653(n) (1978).
203. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652 (h) (1978).
204. 593 F.2d at 370.
205. Id at 371. In support of this principle, the court cited Volkswagenwerk v. Fed. Mari-
time Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261 (1968) and Marathon Oil Co. v. Kleppe, 556 F.2d 982 (10th Cir.
1977).
206. 577 F.2d 1113 (10th Cir. 1977).
207. 593 F.2d at 371.
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excavated materials being left within two feet of the excavation's edge. A
rule required that all excavated matter be stored beyond two feet of the edge
of the excavation. 20 8 The plaintiff asserted that its noncompliance was not
willful nor was it a deliberate, knowing, or conscious abuse of the Act.
20 9
The petitioner contended that the two-foot requirement was both unsafe
and impractical, considering the traveled highway which remained open
during the laying of the sewer.
2 10
The court agreed with the Commission that, although the petitioner
acted without malice and demonstrated concern for its employees' safety,
willfulness may be found absent malicious intent, and upheld the Commis-
sion's finding that the petitioner, aware of the requirement, consciously and
deliberately failed to comply, which warranted a willful violation order.2 1 1
In a dissent, Judge Doyle concurred in the court's affirmance of the
Commission's willful violation order, but dissented from the court's reversal
of the non-serious violation.
21 2
C Jensen Construction Co. of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Commission
In Jensen Construction Co. of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Commission,21 3 the petitioner had been found guilty of two serious
violations of safety standards. Jensen argued two bases for setting aside
OSHRC's order: 1) the procedural ground that the Secretary of Labor
failed to comply with the requirement that a formal complaint be filed with
the Commission within twenty days of notice of contest, 2 ' 4 and 2) the sub-
stantive ground that the provisions of the safety regulation were too
vague.
2 1 5
Jensen was issued the citations for not providing protective fall equip-
ment to its employees, who were working 17 to 23 feet above an expressway
building an overpass bridge. Jensen's policy was to furnish safety equipment
only for fall distances in excess of 25 feet or under exceptional circumstances.
Jensen contested the citations, and the Secretary failed to file a formal com-
plaint with the Commission until 48 days after the receipt of contest. The
Secretary blamed the delay on a heavy caseload.
2 16
The Circuit held that, absent a showing of actual prejudice, dismissal
was too severe a sanction,2 17 especially where safety hazards were of consid-
erable magnitude. The court, distinguishing Cornell & Co. v. Occupational
208. In excavations which employees may be required to enter, excavated or other material
shall be effectively stored and retained at least 2 feet or more from the edge of the excavation.
29 C.F.R. § 1926.651(i)(1) (1978).




213. 597 F.2d 246 (10th Cir. 1979).
214. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.33(a) (1978).





Safety & Health Review Commission,2 18 in which a four-month delay caused
considerable prejudice, agreed with the administrative law judge that Jensen
failed to show any harm caused by the 28-day delay.
2 19
With regard to the vagueness question, the petitioner alleged that the
regulation requiring employees to wear appropriate safety equipment 2 20 was
so uncertain that unrestricted discretion was given the agency. 22 ' The court
stated that, since the words "near proximity" were upheld in a regulation
contested in Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commi'ssion,222 the
language in the present regulation should be upheld. Also, applying the lan-
guage in light of the petitioner's conduct, Judge McWilliams stated that,
since no protective equipment of any kind was furnished, the question of
equipment was irrelevant.
22 3
D. Southern Colorado Prestress Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Commission
The Tenth Circuit in Southern Colorado Prestress Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Commission,224 again upheld an order of the OSHRC for a
serious violation of a regulation concerning safety nets.
Prestress began with a citation issued by an OSHA inspector who ob-
served one of petitioner's employees working more than 25 feet above the
ground without a safety net below, and without other protective equip-
ment.22 5 Numerous issues were brought on appeal; the two procedural is-
sues involving the propriety of amending the citation and permitting the
testimony of an agency area director were resolved in favor of the govern-
ment. Judge Holloway stated that allowing amendment by the Commission
was not an abuse of discretion because the amended pleading was part of the
occurrence enumerated in the original pleading.22 6 With regard to the al-
lowance of the testimony of the issuing officer, attacked on the grounds of
surprise and bias, the court determined that the Commission's rule prohibit-
ing investigating officers from participating in or advising with respect to
OSHRC reports only barred exparte communication, not testimony in open
hearings.
22 7
Another issue raised was whether safety nets were required when any
non-net protective equipment was available, whether it was used or not. 228
The court held that the Fifth Circuit ruling in Brennan v. Southern Contractors
Sewite229 controlled. In Brennan, the court held, contrary to Commission
precedent, that the OSHA standard required the use of safety nets without
218. 573 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1978).
219. 597 F.2d at 248.
220. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.28(a) (1978).
221. 597 F.2d at 248.
222. 505 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974).
223. 597 F.2d at 249.
224. 586 F.2d 1342 (1978).
225. Id at 1344.
226. Id at 1347 (quoting from FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (1977)).
227. Id at 1349.
228. Id at 1345.
229. 492 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1974).
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regard to the practicality or impracticality of other equipment. 23 0 The
Tenth Circuit adopted this reasoning, stating that only the defenses of "im-
possibility" or "greater hazard" could negate the violation.2 3 1 The defense
of "impossibility" includes both technological and economic infeasibility,
but financial burdensomeness alone is not enough to establish impossibil-
ity.232 The defense of "greater hazard" is maintained by proof that an ex-
isting work practice is safer than compliance with the regulation. 233 The
Commission found that safety nets could be erected by the workers, which,
albeit expensive, would not double the time required to erect the build-
ing.234 The Commission found that the danger to which the employees were
exposed in erecting the nets was slight compared to the hazards of working
with no nets. 235 The Circuit, determining that the agency's fact findings






231. 586 F.2d at 1350.




236. Id at 1352.
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